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Professor Kress persuasively demonstrates that
the crime of aggression will not pull the court
into unresolvable political disputes, he also
underscores the narrow force of the crime. The
crime’s deﬁnition and its constraining jurisdictional regime mean that it is unlikely that we
will see an aggression prosecution anytime soon
at the ICC. As a result, with regard to some of
the most contentious issues surrounding the
state use of force today—including humanitarian
interventions and self-defense—the crime of
aggression will have little relevance.
The material that is packed into this wonderful two-volume commentary shows how much
there is to say on this subject, but what it all ultimately means remains uncertain. Is this the
beginning, the middle, or the end of the story
of the development of the crime of aggression?
At Nuremberg, there was another crime born—
crimes against humanity—that was similarly
narrow in its ﬁrst instantiation, but which later
blossomed to become the central crime prosecuted by the ad hoc international criminal tribunals and the ICC. Will the crime of aggression
similarly have an illustrious future after a modest
beginning? Only time will tell.
ALEX WHITING
Harvard Law School

Global Lawmakers: International Organizations
in the Crafting of World Markets. By Susan
Block-Lieb and Terence C. Halliday.
Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge
University Press, 2017. Pp xix, 456. Index.
doi:10.1017/ajil.2019.2
“How law is made affects what law is made,”
asserts this ambitious and multi-layered new
book by Susan Block-Lieb, professor of law and
Cooper Family Chair in Urban Legal Issues at
Fordham Law School, and Terence C. Halliday,
research professor at the American Bar
Foundation (p. 7). While the bare claim itself is
unlikely to upend settled assumptions or provoke
serious debate, the real contributions of the book
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emerge through the carefully observed case studies with which the authors illustrate the claim.
The case studies gradually build up an empirically grounded, meticulously realized argument
that individual lawmakers matter. When one
allows facts to inform theory rather than the
other way around, the authors show, what
becomes clear is that individual lawmakers are
not just governmental delegates, but a whole variety of professionals, industry association representatives, and others with some stake in the
lawmaking process. These actors work not just
through formal processes, but also through an
array of informal ones. Most importantly, their
presence matters to the content of the legal
norms that take hold around the world.
The book thus carves a new place among a
very small universe of empirically grounded analyses of international lawmaking, and an even
smaller universe of accounts that focus on individual actors. It organizes these observations
through the lens of social ecology theory,
which, though unfamiliar to international legal
theory, offers fascinating purchase on the
question of how actors develop international
legal orders. The book also contributes the ﬁrst
in-depth empirical analysis of the lawmaking
work of the little-studied United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL or Commission). After a brief note
on content and method, this essay addresses these
contributions in turn.

I. “ETHNOGRAPHY OF THE GLOBAL”
The “law” with which the book is principally
concerned is international commercial law, or
more speciﬁcally, the treaties and model laws
that seek to “alter world commerce and domestic
markets” by rendering uniform inefﬁciently
patchworked domestic laws (p. 6). The “how”
involves UNCITRAL’s working methods, with
case studies developed from the authors’ ﬁrsthand observations over more than ten years of
the Commission’s work on insolvency, secured
transactions, and international transport. The
authors’ methodology is principally qualitative,
and their data are drawn from direct observations
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of UNCITRAL’s working groups and annual
meetings, interviews of an array of actors involved
in UNCITRAL lawmaking, and analysis of
UNCITRAL drafts and ﬁnal work product. This
produces what the authors term an “ethnography
of the global” (pp. 16, 19).
The method of this book, and indeed the project itself, arose by accident. Block-Lieb and
Halliday describe their serendipitous meeting as
they attended assemblies of UNCITRAL’s working group on insolvency. Block-Lieb, a specialist
in bankruptcy law, attended on behalf of
the American Bar Association’s International
Business Law Section, and Halliday, a sociologist,
attended in the name of the American Bar
Foundation. The book came about, the authors
tell us, because UNCITRAL seats delegates alphabetically by sponsoring organization, and the
seating arrangement brought the authors
together. The anecdote doubles as framing
device: process came to affect substance in the
development of this book, just as in the lawmaking the book observes.
Because the book’s project arose serendipitously, the authors’ research design “evolved as
questions came more sharply into focus”
(pp. 16–17). This, as the authors acknowledge,
led to some asymmetry in the data. They began
the project with their observations of the insolvency working group in which they were both
“embedded” for ﬁve years, keeping detailed
notes about all that transpired, including “the
sequences or speech-turns of all speakers and
the content of their speech,” supplemented
with analysis of work product and many participant interviews (p. 19). Later, the authors sought
to generalize their ﬁndings by expanding the project to analyze the working groups on secured
transactions and international transport. For
these latter two working groups, the authors
relied primarily on participant interviews.
Block-Lieb and Halliday are conﬁdent that
these data are sufﬁciently robust that the authors
“have been able to triangulate our ﬁndings” and
“capture[] both continuities and discontinuities
in the decision-making processes and lawmaking
practices evinced by these hundreds of global lawmakers” (id.). Indeed, the authors were able to
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develop from their interviews fully realized case
studies of the secured transactions and international transport working groups as well.
What emerges from these data is an impressively multifaceted analysis that approaches
UNCITRAL lawmaking from an array of different
angles. After theoretical, historical, and substantive framing, chapters analyze who is involved in
UNCITRAL’s lawmaking work—asking not only
who is present but how often and in what ways
they participate, recognizing that “presence per
se may not confer inﬂuence” (p. 184) (ch. 4);
examine debates within UNCITRAL about
whether and how non-state actors should participate in the lawmaking process (ch. 8);
taxonomize UNCITRAL’s informal lawmaking
practices (ch. 5); and uncover UNCITRAL’s use
of distinct legal “technologies”—speciﬁcally the
choice between treaties and legislative guides
(p. 229) (ch. 6). The book homes in to examine
how the actors and working methods surveyed
led to particular substantive outcomes in each
issue area (ch. 7) and scopes out to examine
how UNCITRAL has faced competition with
other potential lawmakers in each issue area, bargaining over jurisdictional claims and lawmaking
territory (ch. 9).

II. THE “INVISIBLE” WORK OF LAWMAKING
The ambition of the book is much broader
than the very speciﬁc universes of insolvency,
secured transactions, and transport, though
there is much in the book for readers concerned
with each of these substantive areas.1 Rather, as
the title suggests, the authors craft a larger argument that the identities and practices of “global
lawmakers” matter. By global lawmakers, the
authors mean more than governmental delegates.
The authors claim, poetically, that they are
making the “invisible visible” (p. 49). In an
idiom perhaps more familiar to international lawyers, the authors are continuing the tradition of
1
Chapters 3, “Issue-Ecologies in Formation,” and
7, “Whose Global Norms?,” in particular, survey
how UNCITRAL came to approach lawmaking in
each of these substantive areas, and how particular outcomes in those areas were attained, respectively.

423

424

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

“open[ing] the black box of the state,” as well as
looking beyond the state to determine exactly
who sits at the proverbial lawmaking table.2
The authors note that they are building on
prior work by José Alvarez and others that
addresses lawmaking by international organizations3 and on empirical inquiries on business regulation and private standard-setting.
However, international legal scholarship is
populated by many more accounts of law’s structure and application than by analyses of the messy
complicated process of legislation itself. Even in
socio-legal scholarship, which concerns itself
with “law in action,” the focus tends to be on
the practical effects of law and interactions
between legal ofﬁcials and those subject to law’s
strictures, not on the generation of those legal
rules.4 Other areas of rich description, like global
administrative law, focus principally on “administration” rather than “legislation,” though work
in this area has come to embrace a very broad
view of administration.5
Not only has international legal scholarship
paid little attention to the process of lawmaking, but it especially lacks accounts that take
an expansive view of the actors involved in
that international legislation. Because focal
points are often shaped by theories of law, and
the positivist concept of law rooted in state sovereignty still looms large, the nation-state tends
to inhabit the central role as lawmaker in scholarly accounts. There is nevertheless a literature
in this area, populated most notably by important work by John Braithwaite and Peter
Drahos on business regulation;6 Tim Büthe
2
Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties
Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1961
(2002); see also Andrew Moravcsik, Taking
Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International
Politics, 51 INT’L ORG. 513 (1997).
3
JOSÉ ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS
LAW-MAKERS (2006).
4
See, e.g., EXPLORING THE “SOCIO” OF SOCIO-LEGAL
STUDIES 4–8 (Dermot Freenan ed., 2013).
5
Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard
B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative
Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 17 (2005).
6
JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL
BUSINESS REGULATION (2000).
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and Walter Mattli on private standard setting;7
and Steve Charnovitz on NGOs in global governance. 8 My own work has endeavored to
explore the legal mechanisms by which business
entities and groups come to have access and
inﬂuence in international lawmaking,9 and
other accounts consider multi-stakeholder
institutions.10 Yet Block-Lieb and Halliday’s
analysis demonstrates how much work remains.
Departing from prior accounts, the authors
focus on formal lawmaking by international organizations but characterize UNCITRAL not as a
lawmaker itself, but as an “arena” in which lawmaking happens by others (p. 13). This allows
them the freedom to view the various state delegates, professionals, business representatives, and
others as functionally equal participants in the
arena, irrespective of the formal status of each
actor under international legal doctrine.
Moreover, the book does not concern itself
with the legal status of the product of the engagements in this arena. Are the treaties and legislative
guides UNCITRAL produces law, soft law, or notlaw? Setting these questions aside, Block-Lieb
and Halliday focus their analysis on how these
norms are produced and by whom.
The case studies in the book thus come to
serve as a justiﬁcation of the project itself, as
the authors seek to show why the messy collection of expert roundtables, hallway discussions,
cocktail parties, and plenary legislative sessions
matter to the eventual legal texts; which legal
norms govern the formalities and informalities
of this process; and which actors come to matter
in the production of those legal products. BlockLieb and Halliday demonstrate the value of this
analysis subtly but relentlessly throughout the
book by offering missing pieces that disrupt traditional theories.
7
TIM BÜTHE & WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL
RULERS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF REGULATION IN THE
WORLD ECONOMY (2011).
8
Steve Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations
and International Law, 100 AJIL 348 (2006).
9
Melissa J. Durkee, International Lobbying Law,
127 YALE L.J. 1742 (2018).
10
See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott & David Gartner,
Reimagining Participation in International Institutions,
8 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 1 (2012).
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For example, the authors ﬁnd, remarkably,
that “the actors who craft law for the world are
a tiny subset of all the state and non-state delegations and delegates” who attend working group
sessions (p. 186)—in fact, “[a]s few as ten (insolvency) and as many as ﬁfty actors (transport) are
architects of transnational legal orders” (id.).
These participants are, unsurprisingly, disproportionately members of the Global North.
However, the authors also discover, counterintuitively, that “[m]any states with advanced economies did not send consistently high-attending
delegations” (p. 191), and therefore “it is not possible to extrapolate directly from the economic
and geopolitical power of a state to its probable
impact on lawmaking for global markets”
(p. 163). Moreover, contrary to hype, the
BRICS are not inﬂuential—“[T]he supposed
rise of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South
Africa (BRICS) as a new complex of economic
power in the world economy does not reveal itself
in these arenas of global law- and market-making” (id.).
As for non-state actors, many of the tiny set of
individuals responsible for lawmaking are professionals, either serving on state delegations, delegations of professional associations or industry
groups, or on both public and private delegations
by turns. But while larger industry groups have
outsized inﬂuence, “weak industry or economic
actors” like small and medium businesses and
workers are almost completely unrepresented
(p. 187). Who participates and how is shaped
by a mix of formal rules and informal practices
that structure UNCITRAL’s working methods,
which the authors meticulously excavate
throughout the book. These processes are important, the authors claim, because the complement
of participants at the table affects the ultimate
substance of the rules.

III. LAWMAKING AS ECOLOGY
To explain the connection between process,
actors, and the substance of the rules produced,
the authors place their work within two theoretical frames: transnational legal ordering and social
ecology theory. The authors use transnational

425

legal orders (TLOs)11 to help explain what legal
product the actors in this lawmaking ecology seek
to produce: they are working toward the formalization, and ultimately the “settlement,” of legal
norms at national and transnational levels, which
transpires when those norms “come[] to be
accepted as legitimate and an acceptable guide
to action” (p. 28). As the authors elegantly phrase
this, the lawmakers hold the “imaginary” of the
entire TLO formation and settlement process
in their minds at the moment of lawmaking
(p. 30). The project borrows other framings as
well from TLO theory, such as a focus on transnational rather than international orders, and an
expansive deﬁnition of “law.”
The theory that does the most signiﬁcant work
in this account, however, is social ecology. The
theory provides a mechanism to help the authors
map the lawmaking process in terms of patterns
of competitive or cooperative interaction
between different actors as they make use of particular resources and act within particular constraints. Social ecology theory thus explains
actors’ behavior in terms of competition and
cooperation over resources, and survival within
a particular lawmaking space. In this framing,
UNCITRAL positions itself as an actor in an
ecology of international organizations populated
by other lawmaking organisms—like the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) and the International Institute for
the Uniﬁcation of Private Law (UNIDROIT).
To ensure its own survival in this ecology,
UNCITRAL must amass resources. It must cooperate and compete. It must adapt.
Readers trained in law may be struck, as this
reader was, by the power of the metaphor this
theoretical lens embeds. Legal texts often make
use of architectural metaphors, where creating
law is a volitional act of design and implementation by autonomous, legally empowered agents.
11
See TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 11
(Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2015)
(elaborating a theory of transnational legal orders,
deﬁned as “a collection of formalized legal norms and
associated organizations and actors that authoritatively
order the understanding and practice of law across
national jurisdictions”).
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Agents develop, construct, and build legal orders.
We talk about foundational principles and institutional design. There is the idea of balancing
power—and checks and balances—with this
very tangible concept of matter in equilibrium.
An architectural metaphor casts the legal actor
as a rational actor capable of independent, autonomous, and intentional action. The legal actor
uses material to construct ediﬁces according to
his or her will. The process is industrial, modern,
volitional. Humankind tames nature.
An ecological metaphor, by contrast, subsumes the individual lawmaker within natural
processes. Suddenly we are thinking of the raw
materials of law in terms of resources, such as
legitimacy and expertise, and the development
of legal products not as a result of the architect’s
will, but as an organism’s means of survival. We
are thinking in terms of adaptation, competition,
and cooperation. In this account, the fact that
UNCITRAL innovates by expanding its menu of
legal technologies is explained by its need to stay
relevant, because relevance equals survival.
UNCITRAL “maneuvering itself into a space
where resources are likely to be abundant” brings
to mind evolutionary adaptation (p. 65).
UNCITRAL cooperates with UNIDROIT, the
Hague Conference, and other organizations to
avoid destructive competition, and to gather
resources necessary to its development.
This is a different way of thinking about law
than the architectural metaphors suggest. It is
relational, dynamic. It submerges the individual
deciders within an entire ecosystem which constrains or demands those decisions. The lens
offers a set of answers to why lawmaking processes developed as they did, and why the content
of law and the particular legal structure in which
those norms were embedded emerged as they did.
The architectural metaphors do not help with
this. They embed legal decisions within the
intention of the architects. This framing does
not offer many ways to approach the question
of why law took the form it did. We can investigate intentions expressed in the record, or try to
understand the larger structure or function of the
law. To a large extent, however, this metaphor
buries the story of lawmaking within the minds
426
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of the makers just as the old international relations theories buried state intention within the
billiard ball model of action and reaction.

IV. WHOSE LAW IS IT?
The empirically grounded narratives the
authors offer through these theoretical lenses
demonstrate the connection between the identities of the lawmakers and the substance of the
laws made. For instance, in chapter 7, the authors
offer case studies that reveal the “principal faultlines that implicitly or manifestly divided the
actors in the lawmaking space” (p. 265), uncovering the processes by which those rifts were
resolved and tracing “which actors disproportionately placed strong imprints on UNCITRAL’s
global norms” (p. 266). The result is a textured
narrative in which we learn, for example, how
the principal industry association for shipping,
the International Maritime Confederation
(CMI), assumed a role as one of the core players
in the negotiation of the Rotterdam Rules. CMI
prepared the initial draft of the Convention and
played key roles throughout the negotiation of
the agreement. To do this effectively, CMI had
to resolve within its own organization the fundamental issue that would play out within the larger
UNCITRAL working group: divergent interests
between carriers and shippers. CMI spent years
on this problem, conducting its own version of
a notice and comment process and ultimately
offering a draft agreement that “preﬁgured a balance between carrier and shipper interests”
(p. 277). CMI’s method of resolving the problem
would eventually make its way into the ﬁnal
agreement. The story upsets the standard notion
that governmental negotiators are responsible for
treaty texts, or are the principal representatives of
the interests of regulated groups. It has much to
offer those interested in elaborating theories of
legitimacy or process in international governance, or tradeoffs between legitimacy and
effectiveness.
Legitimacy and process issues also emerge in
chapter 5, where the authors examine informal
working practices that offer a “back door to the
Secretariat through expert working groups and
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other informal meeting places” (p. 269), and
come to a head in chapter 8, “lawmaking of lawmaking,” which recounts France’s concern that
private actors were participating so substantially
in UNCITRAL working groups. As the anecdote
about CMI suggests, private experts—industry
and trade association representatives and others—
have an unfettered right to speak and circulate
documents in UNCITRAL working groups and
elsewhere. In fact, UNCITRAL’s non-member
observers share the access rights of memberstate participants on equal terms. UNCITRAL’s
openness to non-state actors matters in particular
because the organization has developed unusual
consensus voting rules in both the working
groups and plenary Commission itself, where
consensus does not mean unanimity, but rather
often involves the moderator proposing a compromise. Because industry experts have speaking
rights equal to those of governmental representatives, those industry players can affect the “center
of gravity,” of the compromise (p. 326).
France’s principal complaint was that nonstate actors “participating on a ‘de facto equal
basis with Member States,’” vitiated the rightful
authority of those state actors over the process
(p. 325). “[P]rivate associations had wheedled
their way into UNCITRAL’s working group
sessions and, more importantly, the ear and pen
of the Secretariat,” as the authors characterize
France’s complaint, and thus these associations
“held importunate authority within UNCITRAL”
(p. 328). France wished to substitute the more
formal United Nations Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC) procedure in which nongovernmental organizations apply for accreditation before receiving very speciﬁc participatory rights in various fora. In France’s view,
substituting that formal application process for
UNCITRAL’s informal working methods would
carry the beneﬁt of reasserting state control over
the process and giving states the opportunity to
close off access to non-state outsiders. As the
authors note, however, the informality of the
working procedures, the openness of UNCITRAL
to outsiders, and the unique “center of gravity”
decision-making procedure were all adaptations
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UNCITRAL made to enhance its own survival

and effectiveness (p. 326).
The anecdote locates the fault lines of an
important debate about whether private actors
should be at the table for the making of critical
international decisions. Should the relationship
between state and non-state entities be hierarchical or equal? And how should it be regulated? The
debate is transpiring not just in the academic literature but in the halls of international organizations as well. For example, the World Health
Organization (WHO) recently adopted a new
“Framework of Engagement,” which established
separate rules for WHO’s interaction with nongovernmental organizations on the one hand,
and private sector and international business
entities, on the other.12 Neither group has participatory rights that equal those of state delegates.
These diverse responses to non-state actors
arise from the fundamental tension between the
specialized knowledge industry representatives,
professionals, and other experts can bring and
legitimacy concerns connected with non-governmental actor participation in lawmaking or
governance processes. Interest representation,
quality of information, and buy-in by regulated
entities stand on the side of opening lawmaking
access to all. But the potential for conﬂicts of
interest, legitimacy deﬁcits, and asymmetry of
representation can pull toward closing off access,
especially when big business or other inﬂuential
actors participate. France’s complaints went
unresolved in Block-Lieb and Halliday’s anecdote, mirroring the larger unresolved story
about the place of private actors, and in particular
business actors, in international lawmaking.

V. SCOPING OUT
The particular challenge of this project is to
contain the “endless particularities,” of an enormously complex lawmaking process within
UNCITRAL’s arena, and marshal these particularities sufﬁciently for productive use (p. 420). In
offering an epidemiological study based on a
12

World Health Organization [WHO],
Framework of Engagement with Non-State Actors,
WHA69/2016/ REC/1 (May 28, 2016).
427
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diverse data set including ﬁrst-hand observations
and interviews, the authors risk saying everything
and thus nothing, and thereby failing to offer signiﬁcant interventions in the diverse scholarly
conversations to which the book seeks to connect. The authors seem to appreciate the weight
of this challenge. They bookend the project with
many varieties of conceptual framing on the one
hand, and an extensive set of potential implications on the other, the latter gathered under the
rubric of “inventive global governance” (p. 389).
In doing so, the authors avoid tying up the particularities too neatly into a new theoretical or
conceptual apparatus beyond the high-level
claim that the actors involved in lawmaking matter. But in so doing, they also cannot entirely
avoid the weight of conceptual jargon common
to one or another intersecting discipline. The
framing that most substantially lifts the particularities into a cohesive whole is social ecology theory, which the authors use nimbly to taxonomize
factors like time, money, expertise, legitimacy,
and infrastructure as resources; to explain
UNCITRAL’s changing missions over time as evolutionary adaptations (or failures to adapt); and
to posit an array of useful generalizations.
Indeed, the author’s use of social ecology theory
in this context would seem to offer a productive
exemplar for investigation in other arenas of
global lawmaking.
In the end, UNCITRAL constitutes just one
of many models of interaction between state
and non-state entities, and its particular style
of lawmaking is built on one of many sets of
working practices, lawmaking procedures, and
distinct historical accidents. Nevertheless, by
giving us a tremendously fact-driven and multifaceted account of lawmaking in this very particular context, the book demonstrates how,
through painstaking data collection, to disrupt
the “plausible folk theories” on which legal
scholarship is sometimes built (p. 441). It challenges broader assumptions about the roles state
and private actors actually take in global lawmaking and the contribution of legal norms to
facilitating or constraining the lawmaking process. And it helps frame important questions for
428
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later work about both the is and the ought of
global governance.
MELISSA J. DURKEE
University of Georgia School of Law
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